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Abstract 
 
Nanotechnology as a social concept and investment focal point has drawn much 
attention. Here we consider the place of nanotechnology in the second great 
technological revolution of mankind that began some 200 years ago. The so-
called nanotechnology revolution represents both a continuation of prior science 
and technology trends and a re-awakening to the benefits of significant 
investment in fundamental research. We consider the role the military might play 
in the development of nanotechnology innovations, nanotechnology’s context in 
the history of technology, and the global competition to lead the next 
technological revolution. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Roughly seven thousand years ago, humans began to leave their nomadic ways 
and form civilizations around the irrigation and cultivation of land. As a result, 
human society and community transformed radically. The creation of government 
and bureaucracy, of social classes, written language, the rule of law, the notion 
of the individual, standing armies, and much more, all emanated from this 
technological change. Dubbed the “irrigation society” by renowned management 
thinker Peter Drucker (Drucker, 1965), this first great technological revolution of 
man lasted over two thousand years.  
 
Nowadays, the word revolution is used rather freely. From the “internet 
revolution” to the “digital music revolution” to the “nanotechnology revolution,” at 
                                                
1 Preprint of chapter to appear in Nanoethics: Examining the Societal Impact of 
Nanotechnology, Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin, James Moor, and John Weckert, eds., (2007). 
what scale does an innovation become more than an innovation? In her classic 
work Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital (2002) Carlota Perez 
defines five technological revolutions since the end of the eighteenth century. As 
new technologies emerge and disseminate, they tend to follow similar economic 
investment cycles which Perez calls “techno-economic paradigms.” However, the 
key realization – and what Drucker was suggesting in his 1965 presidential 
speech to the Society of the History of Technology – is  that we are living in a 
second great technological revolution. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain (around 1750) a man could expect to die in a world very much different 
from the one into which he was born. 
 
A great revolution implies an increasing rate of innovation, and not just 
technological innovation, but also organizational and political, in many different 
fields. There is little doubt that the rate of innovation accelerated after 1750 
(Cross and Szostak, 1995) and is still increasing. Although it is difficult to assess 
the evolution and longevity of such a revolution from within it, we can easily 
believe that as more people and more wealth come into the enterprise of 
innovation, more of Perez’s techno-economic paradigms will occur with 
increasing frequency. Nanotechnology may be one of them.  
 
Technological revolution is always accompanied by political and social change. 
The two go together. The bigger the technological change, the more society must 
adapt to accommodate this objective reality. For example, as farmers began to 
accumulate wealth (that is, food) for communities, an army became necessary to 
protect it. Just as there are larger and smaller technological revolutions, there are 
larger and smaller societal changes to go along with them. In Table 1 we have 
tried to form a hierarchy of revolutions. Inevitably, revolutions are coarse-grained, 
representing a sum of individual innovations that erupt seemingly randomly. We 
define four categories of revolution: great revolutions, of which there have only 
been two, with the present one just beginning; major revolutions or the techno-
economic paradigms of Perez, which usually last some 50 years; minor 
revolutions, which are finer still and are key building blocks of the major 
revolutions; and micro revolutions, which are largely new investment 
opportunities in technology that come about within the larger revolutions but also 
follow a cyclical pattern of investment and saturation. 
 
Soon after World War II, governments worldwide and particularly in the US 
realized that significant investment in the natural sciences could drastically affect 
the power and wealth of nations. Integrated electronics, the Internet, even lasers 
can be lumped into the age of information and telecommunications as a direct 
result of this investment. Much of what is today called nanotechnology naturally 
follows from these lines of technical pursuit and scientific inquiry. Together with 
the theoretical understanding of quantum physics and electrodynamics that has 
developed over the last century, this continuation of research has led us within 
reach of tremendous rewards from the manipulation and control of matter at the 
nanoscale. Whereas these pursuits were somewhat ignored in recent decades – 
significant hype and investment focusing instead on telecommunications, 
software and networking, and biotechnology – there is a growing realization that 
it is time to start pushing materials science and fundamental research again. 
Very recent trends in the global energy crisis and the so-called green revolution 
only add to this notion.  
 
If anything, nanotechnology has become a marketing term to encompass and 
drive this belief that more funding is needed in the physical sciences to maintain 
economic, scientific, and military advantage over international competition. As 
evidence, roughly one-third of the budget for the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI) this year will go to the National Science Foundation (NSF) (Roco, 
2004), which primarily supports unfettered basic research. Still, understanding 
how government and the military drive technological development and how 
nanotechnology as it stands today (and may exist in the future) may relate to 
prior revolutions in history has great value. Responsible encouragement of the 
great technological revolution in which we find ourselves is vital to human 
civilization. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Hierarchy of technological revolutions 
Great Revolutions (there have only been two that we know about) 
1st: Irrigation society, began – ended: approximately 5000 BC - 3000 BC 
2nd: Began with the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the 18th century 
Major Revolutions after 1750 (start date) 
the industrial revolution (1771) 
the age of steam and railways (1829) 
the age of steel, electricity and heavy engineering (1875) 
the age of oil, the automobile and mass production (1908) 
the age of information and telecommunications (1971)  
the age of bio-engineering (1980)? 
the second industrial revolution (1991)? 
the age of machine-phase nanotechnology (2030-50)? 
Minor Revolutions (some examples) 
personal computing 
mobile phones 
global networking 
nanoparticle revolution? 
Micro Revolutions (some examples) 
digital music revolution 
HD TV revolution 
nanoparticle revolution? 
  
 
 
2. Defining nanotechnology 
 
Nanotechnology is a social construction. The word nanotechnology did not 
emerge as a distinct area of science, but rather was introduced externally and 
defined by its usage in the greater societal dialogue. A primary consequence of 
this very public defining of the term nanotechnology is it’s present bipolar nature. 
We take a pragmatic definition of nanotechnology that combines both sides: the 
reality of the word as it is used today primarily by governments, corporations, and 
scientists as well as the vision of what the field might become (Tahan, 2007). The 
reality of nanotechnology – is defined mostly by government funding managers 
and agencies – largely encompasses ongoing research in materials science and 
solid-state physics. Examples include nanoparticles and quantum dots, “nano-
enabled” surface coatings, transistor features that are less than 10 nm scale, 
giant- and colossal-magneto resistance (as in hard drives), spintronics, photonic 
band-gap structures, and more. The definition usually takes a variant like this one 
from the Royal Society of the UK (Royal Society, 2004): “nanoscience is the 
study of phenomena and manipulation of materials at atomic, molecular, and 
macromolecular scales, where properties differ significantly from those at a larger 
scale.” Distinct from this is the more science fiction vision of nanotechnology 
popularized by Eric Drexler (Drexler, 1986) and in books like Neal Stephenson’s 
The Diamond Age (Stephenson, 1995), that of atom-by-atom construction of 
matter and nanoscale (invisible) machines and robots, also referred to as 
“machine-phase nanotechnology.”  
 
The reality definition of nanotechnology is a synonym for fundamental materials 
and matter research, including quantum phenomena at small length scales. The 
origins are clear. For the past 40 years, since the invention of the semiconductor 
transistor, the economic apparatus built around Moore’s Law has been driving 
material features ever smaller. Concurrently, our understanding of the basic 
quantum physics that governs the behavior of interacting particles (of matter and 
light) has been solidifying. More recently, measurement and fabrication 
techniques have reached a point where we can start thinking seriously about 
exploiting some of these novel properties that appear in the small length regime. 
As this level of control gets closer technologically, with clear opportunities in 
sight, the funding of these endeavors becomes more worthwhile. If 
nanotechnology can act as an umbrella term to drive interest and funding, so be 
it. The head of the NNI publicly espouses this viewpoint (Roco, 2004). 
 
We can further separate the larger field nanotechnology, in terms of the reality 
and vision accompanying this emerging technology, from the recent interest in 
nanoparticle and quantum dot technologies. In many ways, certainly as far as 
environmental and human toxicity (Colvin, 2003) are concerned, nanotechnology 
can be defined much more narrowly than the above (as we have argued before 
(Tahan, 2007)): 
 
Nanotechnology, at present, is nanoparticles and nanomaterials that 
contain nanoparticles. Nanoparticles are defined as objects or devices 
with at least two dimensions in the nanoscale regime (typically tens of 
nanometers or less) that exhibit new properties, physical, chemical, or 
biological, or change the properties of a bulk material, due to their size. 
Nanotechnology of the future will include atom-by-atom or molecule-by-
molecule built active devices. 
 
Much of the excitement surrounding nanotechnology comes from the promise of 
newly gained nanoparticle synthesis techniques and a realization of their 
potential in many different areas. Two prominent examples are bio-markers for 
cancer detection (and destruction) and quantum dots in solar-energy conversion 
devices (Scientific American, 2002). Nanoparticle and nanoparticle-composite 
technology may end up solely a minor or micro revolution separate from the 
broader nanotechnology field 
 
 
3. Nanotechnology’s place in an age of ages 
 
It is not only the speed of technological change that creates a "revolution," 
it is its scope as well. Above all, today, as seven thousand years ago, 
technological developments from a great many areas are growing together 
to create a new human environment. (Drucker, 1965)  
Drucker’s words remain true. Nanotechnology as presently (loosely) defined will 
likely have several acts to play in the coming century. Certainly the utilization of 
nanoparticle technology has immediate promise. Much of the rest of 
nanotechnology in the near term can more accurately be placed within the 
information or biotechnology revolutions. In either case, we can find patterns. 
The five major revolutions that Perez outlined all follow a similar pattern. The first 
stage is the installation period, which has an eruption phase, when a new 
innovation is introduced and spreads in conflict with old products and 
technologies. The second is the frenzy phase, when financial capital drives the 
build-up of new technologies but develops tensions within the system. A turning 
point occurs, usually with a recession that follows the collapse of a financial 
bubble, and regulatory changes are made to facilitate and shape the period of 
development. Then follows a period of deployment, which initially has a synergy 
phase, when conditions are all favorable for the full flourishing of the new 
technology, and then the maturity phase, when signs of dwindling investment 
opportunities and stagnating markets appear (Perez, 2002). 
Obviously there is much fluctuation in this model. Since nanotechnology as 
labeled takes on so many meanings, we must separate the key components. 
First, there is the nanoparticle/quantum dot component, and we will call this the 
nanoparticle revolution. Second, there is a continuation of technologies resulting 
in nanoscale techniques for manufacture that are being widely adopted by big 
industry (GE, Dupont, Intel). We can hesitantly call this a second industrial 
revolution (ground up technology?). Finally, in the far distance, there is the 
machine-phase nanotechnology revolution, completely imaginary at this stage. 
Only this stage of development (promising essentially free goods) holds the 
potential for drastic social and political upheaval. 
 
At the current state of development, nanotechnology simply does not represent a 
paradigm shift in scientists’ thinking. Nanoscale investigation is an evolutionary 
outgrowth of a new capability to measure and fabricate at that scale. 
Nanotechnology must be seen in the greater trend of innovation, which, like the 
irrigation revolution, will likely continue well into the next millennium. 
 
 
4. The military and technological development 
 
The military has long been an instigator and shaper of technological innovation. 
Often the high-cost buyer or buyer of last resort, the military can act both to 
encourage a fledgling technology and to prolong a dying one. The US 
Department of Defense (DOD) has clearly taken an interest in nanotechnology 
and accounts for roughly 28% of all federal funding in the loosely defined field in 
FY2005 (Roco, 2004). One prominent example is the Institute for Soldier 
Nanotechnologies (Talbot, 2002) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
(http://web.mit.edu/ISN/). Stronger and lighter materials and more explosive 
bombs (super thermites) are but two examples of nanotechnology’s impact on 
future warfare. 
 
It is widely assumed that military-born technologies spill over into civilian use for 
beneficial purposes. However, the military has specific objectives in its approach 
to technology, which might be very different from those of society at large. 
Historian David Noble lays out three such objectives in his treatise on military 
and technology (Noble, 1987) which are worth considering again in the context of 
nanotechnology. These are 1) performance (emphasis placed on meeting military 
objectives and what follows necessarily from them), 2) command (management 
techniques with decision-making coming solely from the top), and 3) modern 
methods (a fetish for machinery that won’t talk back). Noble argues that it is a 
misconception that the military acts only as an external input of technology. 
Instead, the military shapes the progress and nature of a technology or set of 
technologies throughout their lifetime in many cases.  
 
One clear example of this dates back to the beginning of the US as a nation 
where the military’s quest for interchangeable gun parts helped spur 
mechanization and the industrial revolution in the States. Uniformity was imposed 
by the military contract system. “The benefits of the system, clear to the military, 
were not so clear to many manufacturers, given the high costs, uncertainties, and 
inescapable industrial conflict it engendered” (Noble, 1987). A similar example is 
that of numerical control, pioneered by the Air Force in the 1980s. Numerical 
control envisioned extremely precise machining based on computer and 
mathematical specification and extreme shortening of the chain of command 
from aircraft part specification to manufacture. Industry generally was not 
enthusiastic as the systems were very complex and not as flexible as other less-
demanding, though adequate, metal working techniques. Since the military 
provided such a large and stable base of funding, however, industry followed the 
numerical control path (Noble, 1987). Industry paid the price as foreign 
competition became more nimble. The loss of promising alternative technologies, 
excessive consolidation in the metalworking industry, and slow innovation all 
resulted from the military’s involvement. 
 
An excellent counter-example to this phenomenon is Intel. Although the military 
was the initial buyer of Intel’s first few-transistor circuits, its preferences did not 
shape Intel’s future. Intel would not have survived in the rapidly changing 
consumer environment had its engineers been unable to make decisions.  In fact, 
Intel has thrived on a very long chain of command. In other words, engineers 
very near the technology (but at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy) are 
entrusted with a large amount of discretion to make decisions related to 
technology undeniably vital to the company’s future. The rate of growth in the 
private sector made this possible, although it is important to note that some 
semiconductor fabs continued at a reduced level by specializing their wares for 
military needs (think Fairchild Semiconductor, a founding company of silicon 
valley which has since largely left the commercial consumer electronics arena for 
mostly military and advanced technology contracting). 
 
The long-term trend is an increasing shift of federal research dollars into the 
mission-driven agencies and away from discipline-driven research, such as in 
NSF, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Science, and at NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology). Apart from the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), non-defense federal R&D is about the same in 2004 dollars as it 
was in 1980 (Duke and Dill, 2004). Basic, unfettered physical research in the US 
is declining, except where it goes through the DOD mission agencies and the 
NNI. 
 
In general, the military funding agencies are much stricter about how their grant 
money is used as compared to the NSF. Since all or most of the research money 
comes through the military, and they are the ones asking hard questions and 
threatening to pull funding, scientists at universities feel strong pressure to follow 
the dictated “roadmaps” instead of pursuing new physics as it is identified. 
Because of this, new and perhaps useful phenomena at the nanoscale – which 
may lay the groundwork for the next revolution 50 years hence – may be missed 
in this country. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Lessons from the past 
 
A recent commercial by General Electric featured a “professor of 
nanotechnology” and a super model falling in love: “the perfect combination of 
brains and beauty” (GE, 2005) “Nanotechnologist” has become the new 
computer scientist, driver of the next great wealth generator. While easy to 
dismiss, it is important to remember that but for the abnormal obsession of a 
couple dozen people with the properties of semiconductors, the US would not 
have led the personal computing, networking, and internet revolutions of the last 
half of the 20th Century. A case study is Great Britain, who irreversibly fell behind 
Germany and the US because it faltered in its investment in new technologies 
during the age of steel, electricity, and heavy engineering (1875-1920) (Duke and 
Dill, 2994). Will history repeat itself in the US? 
 
Before World War II, US universities were a joke internationally. Due to the 
demonstrable success of radar and the atomic bomb, the US quickly realized that 
science played a key role in military victories and national power, so a large-
scale investment in fundamental research began. The GI Bill supplied manpower. 
Through this and America’s survival as a superpower after the war (and a 
concurrent influx of highly trained European scientists), the US has had the good 
fortune to lead the last major techno-economic revolution: the age of information 
and telecommunications, as well as many minor ones. But as other countries 
catch up to America’s core strengths, the US leadership position is tenuous. 
Indeed, funding in nanotechnology in Japan and Europe is comparable to that of 
the US at present (Roco, 2004; NNI Triennial Review 2006). 
 
If we want to lay the foundation for the next revolution, it is instructive to go back 
and try to understand what began in the mid 18th century in England. In fact, the 
name Industrial Revolution is a misnomer, as innovations took place in many 
areas such as farm and home, in addition to manufacturing (Cross and Szostak, 
1995). No one knows for sure why the Industrial Revolution began where and 
when it did. There are many hypotheses: Britain’s institutional support of 
technology (world’s first patent system, strong private property rights, acceptance 
of Jewish and other ethnic minorities); urbanization and increased life 
expectancy; encouragement of an empirical and utilitarian tradition (e.g., Francis 
Bacon’s writings); consolidation of agricultural land by lords with agricultural 
efficiencies; increased worker migration to cities; movement of work away from 
the guild system (putting out system); raw material advantages; less regulation. 
The list goes on. But other European countries like Germany and France, who 
also had better educational systems, shared many of these advances in whole or 
in part. The one thing other countries lacked was a transport system even 
remotely comparable to what England had put in place. “Transport improvements 
greatly accelerated the processes of regional specialization and urbanization in 
England. They also led to a dramatic increase in personal travel” (Cross and 
Szostak, 1995). This encouraged the interaction between innovators with varied 
backgrounds, expertise, and ideas, which is essential to the innovation process. 
Regionalization and localization led to mechanization. 
 
In the present day, the US has a mixed infrastructure in idea transportation. 
Although it has pioneered advancements in collaboration and interaction online, 
several other countries, such as South Korea or Taiwan have superior 
broadband networking penetration. Residents of the US have always enjoyed 
freedom to move about the country, and career success often demands it. The 
US also enjoys the benefits of scale, with a large number of excellent yet 
independent universities and a large entrepreneurial culture (exhibited in 
individuals and in organizations such as top-notch private-equity entities). 
Presently, first-world countries like Great Britain, Australia, and Japan – although 
investing heavily in nanotechnology research – are struggling to match the US’s 
highly efficient venture capital ecosystem. However, immigration rules since 9/11 
have decreased the influx of talent from around the world, traditionally a key 
driver of science research. But none of this compares to the great experiment 
that is ongoing in the very nature of science investment in the US. 
 
Industrial science and technology in the US has undergone a dramatic change in 
recent years, from “Closed Innovation” to “Open Innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003). 
In essence, the era of industrial research labs is over (Duke and Dill, 2004). 
Where significant basic research used to occur in the bowls of Bell Labs or Xerox 
PARC, industry has now focused more on development of near and more 
economically justifiable engineering. Extreme examples of this are companies 
like Intel and Cisco, who “outsource” virtually all their research. They leverage 
their research budgets by partnering with academia and other companies and 
start-ups. This is different from and in addition to what’s usually called 
outsourcing – the farming out of actual work or jobs (in this case in research and 
development) to countries such as China and India.  “Under Open Innovation, a 
company’s value chain is no longer fully contained within the company, and 
ideas, people, and products flow across company boundaries, to and from other 
companies, universities, and even countries” (Duke and Dill, 2004). 
 
This business trend has left only universities and national labs to fulfill the need 
for basic research in the US. From 1953 to 1996, the fraction of basic research 
that was performed in universities and federal labs rose from 33% to 61% (Duke 
and Dill, 2004). Is this enough to make up the difference? We simply do not yet 
know how this change will affect US competitiveness in the future. “The growth of 
biotechnology in America is largely a story of seedling ideas that came from 
academic scientists in research universities, funded by venture capitalists, and 
manned by bright graduate and postdoctoral students” (Duke and Dill, 2004).  
Nanotechnology may prove to be the same story, or not. 
 
There are a number of conditions that allowed the Industrial Revolution to move 
quickly to the US: fast population growth; natural and artificial protection (via the 
Atlantic Ocean and tariffs); copying and extending prior work (of the British 
banking system, corporate, and insurance; manufacturing techniques, etc.); relief 
from bankruptcy (limited liability); legal monopoly over inventions through patent 
law – with strict granting of patent applications to ensure that only new and useful 
ideas were patented; lack of guild monopolies; vast natural resources; receptivity 
to innovation. What country today has the most of these benefits? As Duke and 
Dill point out (Duke and Dill 2004), the US must focus on its core strengths: 
innovative and fast-moving companies, talented people, and strength in basic 
research. With these concerns, the motivation of the NNI to pump money into 
fundamental research under the cover of nanotechnology seems like a very good 
move. 
 
While on the surface the business trend to open innovation seems a good way to 
speed up business and technology growth, it is unclear what the long term 
affects on the US will be. If the majority of basic research ends up in Asia, can 
US corporations seriously believe they will be allowed to “manage” and benefit 
from these new discoveries indefinitely? 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
That we are living through a great technological revolution with no end in sight is 
clear. What gets murky is our attempt to sub-classify smaller revolutions within 
this larger landscape of merging innovations. The reality of nanotechnology as it 
stands today is the continued evolution of prior trends in information and 
materials science began after World War II. That we are at a point where the 
exact synthesis of nanoparticles and other nanotechnologies holds great promise 
for medicine, energy conversion, etc., has only fueled the belief that a renewed 
surge of investment is needed to harvest these potential technological 
breakthroughs. We have neither begun to approach the vision of nano-machines 
and robots that popularized the term nanotechnology, nor to adequately 
understand the difficulty in getting there. So the great technological revolution 
that this may imply lies still in waiting for us to discover. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The title – “Nanotechnology R(evolution)” – originates with a former student, 
Michael Markovics, in my class of spring 2005 at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison: Nanotechnology and Society (Tahan, 2006). The author would like to 
thank members of the Wisconsin Nanotechnology and Society Initiative for useful 
conversations and especially Greta Zenner for critical reading and editing. The 
author is supported by a USA National Science Foundation Math and Physical 
Sciences Distinguished International Postdoctoral Research Fellowship (Award 
No. DMR-0502047). 
 
 
References 
 
Chesbrough, H. (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting From Technology, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.  
 
Colvin, V.L. (2003). The Potential Environmental Impact of Engineered 
Nanomaterials. Nature Biotechnology 21(10): 1166-1170. 
 
Cross, G. and R. Szostak (1995). Origins of Industrialization. In: Technology and 
American Society: A History, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
 
Duke, C. and Dill, K. (2004). The Next Technological Revolution: Will the US 
Lead or Fall Behind? March 22. Available at 
http://www.biophysics.org/pubaffairs/revolution.pdf. Accessed 2006 Sep 27. 
 
Drexler, E (1986). Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology, 
Anchor Books, New York. 
 
Drucker, P.F. (1965). The First Technological Revolution and Its Lessons. 
Presidential address to the Society for the History of Technology; 1965 Dec 29; 
San Francisco, CA. 
 
GE (2005). The Perfect Romance, http://www.ge.com/stories/en/13085.html 
 
National Research Council (2006). A Matter of Size:  Triennial Review of the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative  Committee to Review the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, National Research Council, 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11752.html 
 
Noble, D.F. (1987). Command Performance: A Perspective on Military Enterprise 
and Technological Change. In Smith M.R., editor. Military Enterprise and 
Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Perez, C. (2002). Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The 
Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages, E. Elgar Pub., Cheltenham, UK. 
 
Renn and Roco (2006). Ortwin Renn and M. C. Roco, Nanotechnology and the 
Need for Risk Governance, J. Nanoparticle Research 8 (2) 
 
Roco, M.C. (2004). Nanoscale Science and Engineering: Unifying and 
Transforming Tools. AIChE Journal 50(5): 890-897. 
 
Rosenbloom, R.S. and Spencer, W.J. (1996). Engines of Innovation, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston 
 
The Royal Society, London (2004). Nanoscience and Nanotechnology: 
Opportunities and Uncertainties. Document 19/04. Available at 
http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm. Accessed 2006 27 Sep.  
 
Scientific American editors (2002). Understanding Nanotechnology, Warner 
Books, New York. 
 
Stephenson, N. (1995). The Diamond Age or, A Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer, 
Bantam Books, New York.  
 
Tahan, C. (2006). Science and Technology Studies 201: Nanotechnology and 
Society, URL http://www.tahan.com/charlie/nanosociety/course201/   
 
Tahan. C., et al. (2006). Charles Tahan, Ricky Leung, G. M. Zenner, K. D. 
Ellison, W. C. Crone, and Clark A. Miller, Nanotechnology and Society: A 
discussion-based undergraduate course, Am. J. Phys. 74, 4, April 
 
Tahan, C. (2007). Identifying Nanotechnology in Society. In M. Zelkowitz, editor. 
Advances in Computers, Elsevier. Preprint at 
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612080  
 
Talbot, D. (2002). Super Soldiers, MIT Tech Review 105(8): 44-50.  
